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COMMENTS
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc.-The Legal
Fiction Created by a Single Copyright Registration of
a Computer Program and its Display Screens
In Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc.,' Judge Daly, of the
United States District Court, District of Connecticut, ruled that a single
registration of a computer program protects the program and the screen
displays separately by way of a "legal fiction of two separate registra-
tions. ' 2 The District Court issued the verdict in light of the recent policy
decision of the United States Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
("Copyright Office") 3 disallowing separate registrations for a computer
program and its screen displays. This policy decision extended copyright
protection on a computer program to both the program and its screen
displays, 4 and was meant to clarify "to the public and the courts [the
Copyright Office's] view that multiple claims are unnecessary ... to as-
sert copyright in the screen displays." 5 After finding that some screens
contained copyrightable subject matter,6 the Manufacturers Technologies,
Inc. ("M. T.L ") court held there was substantial similarity between many
screen displays of the two works, indicating the defendant infringed the
plaintiff's computer program and screen display copyrights.7 This Com-
ment examines whether the conclusions reached in M. T.L conform to
the Copyright Office's policies and traditional copyright infringement
analysis.
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts and holding of M TI.
Part II outlines the scope of copyright protection for screen displays, dis-
cussing the statutory developments relating to computer program and
screen display copyrights, the elements of a copyright infringement cause
of action, the landmark cases in the area and the hearings held by the
1 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
2 Id. at 993.
3 See also Registration Decision: Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53
Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988) [hereinafter Registration Decision]. The policy decision "constitute[s] in
essence a confirmation of the general registration policies first adopted in the 1978 registration
regulations" of 37 C.F.R. § 202. Id. at 21,820. In the past, the Copyright Office had allowed sepa-
rate registrations for computer programs and their screen displays. Since the policy decision merely
clarifies the existing regulation, no modification was made to the regulation at 37 C.F.R. § 202. Id.
See infra note 140 for the text of the regulation.
4 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,817.
5 Id. at 21,820 (emphasis added).
6 See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for copy-
rightable subject matter.
7 The court held that several screen displays in the defendant's computer program, "QUICK
COST," infringed the plaintiff's copyrights on its "COSTIMATOR®" program. (COSTIMATOR®
is a registered trademark of Manufacturer Technologies, Inc.) See infra notes 78-85 for a discussion
of the traditional substantial similarity analysis.
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Copyright Office in 1987 on registering screen displays.8 Part III dis-
cusses the apparent conflict between the Copyright Office's policy deci-
sion and the holding in MT.L, as well as inconsistencies within the
M. T.L opinion. Part IV concludes that although the M.TL court found a
way to harmonize previous decisions, the holding did not conform to the
Copyright Office's recent policy decision.
I. Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc.
In 1982 and 1983, M.T.I. developed the COSTIMATOR® program,
a computer program9 for estimating the cost of machining a manufac-
tured part. 10 M.T.I. expended over 3,000 hours producing the COSTI-
MATOR® program"' and its 300 plus screen displays.1 2 The screens
assisted the user in selecting appropriate choices and displayed the final
estimate.' 3 One of the program's primary attractions was its efficiency' 4
8 For the notice of the public hearing and request for written submissions to the Copyright
Office, see Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays; Public Hearing, 52 Fed. Reg.
28,311 (1987) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (copies of the transcript, as well as written submissions of
participants cited throughout this Comment, can be obtained from the Copyright Office, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559) See Registration Decision, supra note 3, for the policy decision
resulting from the hearings. Although the transcript of the hearing was not published in its entirety,
a summary of relevant testimony was published in Registration of Computer Screens is Subject of Copyright
Office Hearing, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 507 (1987).
9 A computer program is a detailed sequence of written instructions that are executed by a
computer to perform a specific function. A program is considered the complete plan "for the tran-
scription of data, coding for the computer, and plans for the absorption of the result into the sys-
tem.... [It is] a set of instructions or steps that tells the computer exactly how to handle a complete
problem - payroll, production scheduling, or other applications." C. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY
& HANDBOOK 409 (1980). A computer system is comprised of both hardware and programs. The
hardware is the physical equipment used for processing data. Programs, are necessary for the hard-
ware to perform any functions. The programs allow the user to accomplish various tasks.
The computer program consists of a series of instructions known as "source code." Id. at 508.
The instructions are written in a programming language such as BASIC, Fortran, Cobol, etc. These
languages are as different as English, Spanish, and French. Before the computer can execute the
program, however, the source code must be converted to "object code," a series of "0" and "1"
symbols which instruct the computer. Id. at 354. The code instructs the computer to perform cer-
tain functions and possibly, to produce a visible display on the screen.
The term "software" refers to a program that has been fixed in a storage device (ROM, floppy
disk, hard disk, etc.). See infra note 56 for a discussion of programs stored in ROM. The term simply
refers to the fact that a program allows the electronics inside of the computer to accomplish a task.
The term "software" is commonly used to refer to not only programs but any documentation which
comes with the programs and any source material (such as flowcharts). Id. at 501.
10 Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 988 (D. Conn. 1989). The
program was actually developed by Thomas Charkiewicz and Rene Laviolette for M.T.I. Mr.
Charkiewicz was the incorporator, president and controlling stockholder of M.T.I. Id. at 987.
11 Id. at 988.
12 Id. at 1000 n.20.
13 Most application programs are designed to produce displays so the user can effectively inter-
face with the computer to carry out the program's function. Many software manufacturers employ
human interface groups to study the aesthetic, psychological, graphical and ergonometric factors
that influence the audiovisual appeal of the screen display. See Written Submission of Apple Com-
puter, Inc. at 4-5 (September 4, 1987) in response to Public Hearing, supra note 8. These groups do
not actually write the program which produce the display(s); they only advise the programmers on
the recommended design. The screen display is then created by the source code the programmer
writes. See supra note 9. However, there may be several ways to write the source code and still
produce the same, or substantially similar, screen display. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Many different computer, programs can produce the same 'results';
whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of images and sounds.");
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. at 991 ("two different computer pro-
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which depended, to a great extent, upon its screen designs. 15 The pro-
gram sold for approximately $20,000.16
M.T.I. obtained valid copyright registrations on four different ver-
sions of the COSTIMATOR® program in April, 1985.17 Marketing ef-
forts began as early as 1983. Since copyrights exist from the time a work
is created,18 M.T.I.'s program was technically "copyrighted" in 1983.
However, until the work is actually submitted to the Copyright Office for
registration, an infringement action cannot be decided.' 9 M.T.I. did not
have a "registered copyright" until April, 1985. Between 1983 and 1985,
therefore, M.T.I. had a copyright without a registration. The interest in
the work was still protected, but an infringement action could not con-
clude until M.T.I. registered the work. Once the work was registered and
the action instituted, the suit related to any infringement from the date of
creation - 1983 in the instant case.20
From December 5, 1983, to May 22, 1984, Cams, Inc. ("Cams") ac-
ted as M.T.I.'s sales representative for the COSTIMATOR® program. 21
As a sales representative, Cams received copies of all promotional mate-
rial showing the various screen displays. 22 In addition, Cams employees
grams, whose source codes were created independently of one another, can produce computer
screen displays which are very similar, if not totally alike"); Digital Communications Assoc., Inc., v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("a computer screen display can be
copied by means of a computer program which is not itself a copy of the computer program which
generated the screen display which has been copied"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohan, 564 F. Supp.
741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("it is quite possible to design a game that would infringe Midway's audiovi-
sual copyright but would use an entirely different computer program"); Written Submission ofJack
Russo, Esq., Nelson & Russo at 13 (September 9, 1987), in response to Public Hearing, supra note 8
("Different programming can generate the same user [interface].").
14 "[T]he structure and efficiency of the screen displays is often the most significant selling point
of the computer program, distinguishing it from competing programs." Plaintiff's Trial Brief on the
Liability Issues Raised in the Complaint at 2, Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F.
Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989) (No. 85-253).
15 [M.T.I.'s] design efforts focused on producing a computer program whose visual display
screens were structured to most efficiently solve their user's problems from the user's per-
spective. This efficient structure includes both the internal structure of the individual
screen displays themselves as well as the external or organizational structure of the screen
displays as they relate to each other.
Id.
16 706 F. Supp. at 990.
17 Id. at 988.
18 "Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978 subsists from its creation." 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
19 "[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). See
also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 18.
21 706 F. Supp. at 988.
22 Between the spring of 1983 and June, 1986, M.T.I. distributed 28,100 brochures showing
seven of the COSTIMATOR® screen displays. Although these brochures did not contain notice of a
copyright, they were distributed as part of a promotional package which contained a copyright no-
tice. Id. at 998-99. In addition, M.T.I. distributed 112 copies of a brochure entitled "The System"
to key accounts. These, too, did not contain a copyright notice. However, in February, 1987, after
M.T.I. filed suit and discovered this error, M.T.I. sent stick-on labels containing the copyright notice
to each of the recipients. Id. To secure copyright protection, a published work must have a copy-
right notice affixed to it. M. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.13[A]-[B] (1989) [hereinafter
NINIMER]. This general rule has two exceptions: 1) omitting notice from a relatively small number of
copies is excused; and, 2) omitting notice is excused if the work is registered within five years after
the publication without notice and reasonable efforts have been made to remedy the defect. Id. If
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viewed the program in operation on several occasions during demonstra-
tions to customers and were allowed to view and photograph the screen
displays. 23 On May 22, 1984, Cams notified M.T.I. of its intent to termi-
nate its sales representation and to compete with M.T.I. by selling its
own cost estimating program.24
Cams invested about 1,500 hours to produce its QUICK COST III,
V and X programs25 which sold for. approximately $1,000 to $2,500
each.26 Cams obtained a copyright registration on the QUICK COST
programs in February, 1985, two months before the registration of
M.T.I.'s COSTIMATOR® program. The date of registration does not
determine which party will prevail in an infringement action.27 Rather,
originality of authorship, date of first publication and other factors dis-
cussed throughout this Comment are determinative. 28
M.T.I. filed suit against Cams on June 3, 1985, alleging copyright
infringement of its COSTIMATOR@ program's screen displays. 29 Qn
August 28, 1986, the court granted M.T.L.leave to amend its complaint
"to incorporate a newly issued copyright registration into its Count for
copyright infringement."3 0 The new registrations included a copyright
on COSTIMATOR® screen displays received in January, 1986, and a
copyright on its user manual received in May, 1986.31
The District Court first considered whether copyright protection ex-
tended to screen displays. The court examined the recent decisions of
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World 3 2 and Digital Communication Associ-
the omission does not fall within these two exceptions, the work enters the public domain and no
longer receives copyright protection. Id. In the instant case, since M.T.I. omitted the notice from a
small number of copies and since M.T.I. made efforts to remedy the omission during the suit, the
court considered the error harmless. 706 F. Supp. at 1000.
23 706 F. Supp. at 988-89.
24 Id. at 989. The opinion stated that although "Cams [was] preparing to compete with M.T.I.
as early as January 1984, they made no effort to notify Cams of this fact until May 22, 1984." Id.
(emphasis added). However, when read in context, it is apparent that the court intended to state
"they made no effort to notify M. T.L of this fact until May 22, 1984." Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 990. QUICK COST III, V and X are three separate versions of the same program,
QUICK COST. The program is also known as "RAPIDCOST." The three versions are "very simi-
lar, if not exactly identical" but are marketed through different channels. Id. at 989 n.7. The pro-
grams will be referred to collectively as "QUICK COST."
26 Id.
27 2 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 7.16.
28 Id. Other factors that are relevant to determining which party will prevail in an infringement
action include: access to the copyrighted work; substantial similarity between the works; and
copyrightability of the subject matter. These factors are discussed throughout this Comment.
29 Computer programs are very technical and require a large amount of time and money to
produce. The production expenses and the great profit potential have caused many companies and
individuals to seek shortcuts in manufacturing software. One way to eliminate costs is to copy all, or
part, of another work and incorporate it into a new piece of software marketed under a different
name. For this reason, manufacturers of original software have sought legal protection of their in-
vestments. Ultimately, the manufacturers have two objectives: 1) halt both the direct copying of
their programs and the use of similar screen displays (Written Submission ofJack Russo, Esq., Nel-
son & Russo at 33 (Sept. 1987) in response to Public Hearing, supra note 8); and, 2) "make use of
programs of others without being held to have infringed." (W. CARBAHAN, PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMs: A DILEMMA 55 (1972)).
30 Plaintiff's Trial Brief on the Liability Issues Raised in the Complaint at 5, Manufacturers
Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989) (No. 85-253).
31 Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 988 (D. Conn. 1989).
32 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In Broderbund, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
"PRINT MASTER" program infringed its copyright on "THE PRINT SHOP" program. Both pro-
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ates, Inc. v. Sofiklone Distributing Corp. ,3 as well as the hearings held in
1987 by the Copyright Office on the issue. 34 The court considered two
possible tests. First, the court contemplated requiring M.T.I. to show
substantial similarity of both the computer screen displays and the un-
derlying program code. 35 Second, the court contemplated treating "the
single registration of the computer program as accomplishing two inter-
related yet distinct registrations; one of the program itself and one of the
grams were used to create greeting cards, signs, posters and banners. The court held that copyright
protection for the underlying program code extended to the screen displays. The court relied on the
decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) which held that copyright
protection extended to the structure, sequence, and organization of a computer program. In
Broderbund, the court reasoned that the organization of a computer program is a "nonliteral" aspect
of a computer program (one that is not based solely on the written code) and that other nonliteral
aspects should therefore be protected as well. 648 F. Supp. at 1132-33. After determining that the
defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted program, and concluding that there was substan-
tial similarity between the two programs based on the traditional two step audience test, the court
held that the PRINT MASTER infringed the copyright of THE PRINT SHOP. See infra notes 78-85
and accompanying text for a discussion of the two step audience test.
Many commentators and courts have considered the Broderbund reasoning faulty since Whelan
specifically stated that evidence of similarity between screen displays is not conclusive proof of in-
fringing the program's copyright. The Whelan court stated:
Insofar as everything a computer does, including its screen outputs, is related to the pro-
gram that operates it, there is necessarily a causal relationship between the program and the
screen outputs. The screen outputs must bear some relation to the underlying programs,
and therefore they have some probative value .... Our holding that evidence of screen
outputs may be admissible does not necessarily mean that such evidence would be alone
sufficient.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244 n.45. The Broderbund court failed to consider the similarities of the under-
lying code of the two programs, and compared only the visual screen displays. Based on Whelan, the
Broderbund court should have evaluated both the screens and the program to determine whether
infringement occurred. According to Al. TI.L, "the [Broderbund] court appears to have misinterpreted
the Third Circuit's holding in Whelan Associates, Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory." 706 F. Supp. at
992. See also Note, The Copyrightability of Computer Program Screen Displays, 10 HASTINGS COMM. ENT'.
L.J. 859, 871 (1988); Comment, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and Feel"
Copyright Protection for the Display Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program, 13 RurTGERS COMP. &
TECH. L.J. 105 (1987); Computer Screen Display is Not Protected by Program Copyright, 33 Pat. Trademark
& CopyrightJ. (BNA) 611 (1987).
33 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In Softklone, the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement of
its CROSSTALK XVI communications program, by the defendant's MIRROR program. The court
rejected the holding of Broderbund and concluded that "copyright protection of a computer program
does not extend to screen displays generated by the program." Id. at 455. The court based its
reasoning on the idea that "screen displays generated by computer programs are not direct 'copies'
or 'reproductions' of the literary or substantive content of the computer programs." Id. In this
regard, the court recognized that it is possible to create similar or identical screen displays using a
different underlying code. Id.
34 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,817. After conducting hearings in September, 1987,
to determine whether to accept a registration for a screen display separate from the underlying
computer program, the Copyright Office concluded that it would no longer accept deposits of screen
displays separately from the underlying program. The policy decision stated, "the Copyright Office
of the Library of Congress has determined that all copyrightable expression owned by the same
claimant and embodied in a computer program ... including computer screen displays, is consid-
ered a single work and should be registered on a single application form." Id The decision also
stated that all copyrightable elements of the registered program would be protected by the single
registration. Id. at 21,818. The policy decision considered the fact that similar screen displays could
be generated by different program code. However, the Copyright Office still concluded that "this
does not alter the fact that the computer program code and screen displays are integrally related and
ordinarily form a single work." Id. at 21,819.
35 Manufacturers Technologies. Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989). See
supra notes 9 & 13 for a discussion of program code and the relation to screen displays.
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screen displays." '3 6 The court adopted the second approach which cre-
ated "the legal fiction of two separate registrations" 37 and concluded
that copyright protection extended to the screen displays of a computer
program.
After deciding the appropriate test, the court conducted a lengthy
analysis of the similarities between COSTIMATOR® and QUICK
COST.3 8 The court found substantial similarity between the screen dis-
plays of the two programs. It held that Cams infringed the screen display
copyright as well as the program code copyright as it related to the
screen display. The court enjoined Cams from any further manufactur-
ing or marketing efforts.3 9
II. The Scope of Copyright Protection
A. Statutory Developments Relating to Computer Program
and Screen Display Copyrights
Congress derives its power to enact copyright laws from the United
States Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries." ' 40 A copyright is an intangible right an
individual holds to the exclusive privilege of copying and publishing a
36 ld at 993.
37 Id. The two tests would allow courts to reach extremely different results. Under the first test,
the infringement suit would not succeed unless both the program code and the screen displays were
copied. In the instant case, this would result in a finding for Cams, since the court found no substan-
tial similarity between the underlying program code. The second test, the one adopted by the court,
seems contradictory to the Copyright Office's policy decision. The second test allows the court to
analyze the work as if separate registrations existed-one on the screen alone, and one on the pro-
gram code. However, the Copyright Office has specifically disallowed such separate registrations.
See supra note 34. The second test does not recognize that the program and the screen displays form
a single work. Under the second test, the court may find infringement, as it did in M.T.L, if only the
screen displays are copied, without considering copying of the underlying program. See also infra
notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
38 The court found that there was no "evidence of source or object code similarity" and there-
fore did not discuss similarities between the underlying code of the two programs. Id. at 1000.
Rather, the court considered the similarities between the screen displays of both programs as well as
the navigational commands (the keys that a user would strike to move between screens). The court
found substantial similarity in several aspects of the screen displays, including: the flow of the dis-
plays (this is the order in which the screens appear when using the program); the format of the
screen displays (this includes centered headings, alphabetized lists, and capitalization of key words);
the navigational method (both programs used the backspace and spacebar keys to switch between
the screens); the identification method (particularly the identification of certain tools and depart-
ments and the subsequent reference displays); and in the several specific screen displays themselves
(where certain portions of the displays were not ordinary and yet appeared in both programs).
Recently, the Copyright Office further clarified its position on the copyrightability of screen
displays. Specifically, the Copyright Office stated that "menu screens and similar functional inter-
faces consisting of words or brief phrases in a particular format are not registerable." 38 Pat. Trade-
mark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) 1 (1989). This would include "names, titles, and phrases such as column
headings, simple checklists .... format, arrangement or typography." Id. The Copyright Office's
clarified position suggests that in ,l. TI., neither the format of the screen displays nor the identifica-
tion method were copyrightable subject matter. See bfra notes 194-96 and accompanying chart for a
complete analysis of the elements the .. T.I. court considered.
39 706 F. Supp. at 1006.
40 U.S. CONsT. art. VIII, § 8. The current copyright laws are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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work the individual has produced. 41 Through the Copyright Act, copy-
right protection is available for various works of authorship: literary
works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; and sound recordings.4 2
In 1964, the Copyright Office began accepting computer programs
for registration under the statute's "literary works" category. 43 This cat-
egory was defined as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, man-
uscripts, phonorecords, films, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied.44 Based on this legislative definition, computer programs are
likened to books, periodicals and manuscripts. 45 The copyright does not
protect the actual function of the program. Rather, protection is af-
forded to the written code - either the source code or the object code -
which is deposited for registration. 46
Copyright law underwent revision in 1980 to incorporate the recom-
mendations of a congressional committee, the National Commission on
New Technology Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).47 The CONTU
report noted that software is expensive to produce but easy to duplicate
and appropriate.4 8 To foster competition and protect "intellectual ef-
fort," the Commission determined that copyright protection should be
afforded to computer programs. 49 However, the Commission did not de-
termine the scope of copyright protection for computer programs.
Rather, in recommending that copyright protection extend to computer
programs, the Commission specifically noted, "should a line need to be
drawn to exclude certain manifestations of programs from copyright that
line should be drawn on a case by case basis by . . . the federal
judiciary." 50
41 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (5th ed. 1979).
42 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
43 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 361, 362 (1964).
44 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
45 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.04[C]. The Copyright Office had three prerequisites for regis-
tration of computer programs. First, the "elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing and
literary expression" had to be sufficient to constitute original authorship. Second, the program had
to be published and include a copyright notice. Finally, the copies that were deposited for registra-
tion had to be fixed in a tangible medium in a language that was intelligible to human beings. I 
BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 361, 367 (1964). The last requirement suggested that programs written in
object code could not be deposited since they were only a series of "0" and "I" characters that
would have no intelligible meaning. The requirement seems to suggest that only programs in source
code (a code consisting of words, numbers and symbols that can be read by humans as well as
computers) would be acceptable. See supra note 9.
46 See supra note 9.
47 Congress established CONTU under the Act of December 31, 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88
Stat. 1873 (1984). The changes recommended by CONTU were adopted in the Computer Software
Copyright Act of 1980, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
117 (1988)).
48 "The cost of developing computer programs is far greater than the cost of their duplication."
Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Copyright L. Re-
ports (CCH) 26 (July 31, 1978). The Report also noted, "if the cost of duplicating information is
small, then it is easy for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate it." Id. at 24.
49 Id. at 27.
50 Id. at 57.
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Congress adopted the CONTU report in whole and incorporated it
into the current copyright laws. 51 Computer programs are still protected
under the literary works category. However, there are some difficulties
in determining the scope of protection based on this classification. As
with all literary works, only the means of expression, not the underlying
idea, receives protection. 52 In addition, where only a limited number of
ways exist to express an idea, the expression is not copyrightable,
although this is open to judicial interpretation. 53 This idea/expression
dichotomy has caused difficulties for many courts faced with the question
of whether copyright protection extends to a computer program.54 For
example, a process is an idea and thus is not copyrightable. However,
based on legislative history,55 courts have extended copyright protection
51 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988).
52 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it- is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988).
53 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967).
When the... subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic necessarily requires," if not
only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would
mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
possibilities of future use of the substance.
379 F.2d at 678 (citation omitted).
A federal district court properly applied the rule in Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec
Corp., No. C 88-20352 RPA (N.D. Cal. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file, #13012). In Sy-
manlec, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's computer outlining program, "Grandview," in-
fringed it's copyright on "PC-Outline." The programmer who wrote "Grandview" had formerly
written "PC-Outline" for the plaintiff. Telemarketing Resources' main allegation was that several
screen displays were substantially similar and therefore Symantec Corp. infringed the copyright.
The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after analyzing the substantial
similarity of the two programs under the audience test. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the audience test. The court found that a menu window which lists different
functions the user can perform is an "idea of the outlining program." Id. at 13. Similarly, the use of
"pull down windows" which a user accesses to direct the program's function are "commonplace in
the computer software industry" and therefore, are not copyrightable subject matter. Because the
idea of an outlining program can only be expressed in a limited number of ways, certain elements,
such as the menu windows and navigational keys, are not protected by copyright. Id. at 13-15.
54 The idea/expression dichotomy is best understood by reviewing Professor Nimmer's example
of Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet." In that work, the "idea" is a romance "between members of
two hostile families." This idea is not protected by copyright. However, the story line, dialogue,
setting and characterization are all expressions of the idea and are protected by copyright. 3 NIM-
MER, supra note 22, § 13.03[A]. In terms of a computer program, word processing, for example, is
an idea which does not receive copyright protection. The problem lies in determining exactly what
constitutes an expression of that idea. Factors such as screen display, choice of navigational keys,
flow of the screen displays, and the like are all taken into consideration when looking at the expres-
sion of the idea. See, e.g., Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 994-96
(D. Conn. 1989).
55 In adopting the recommendations of CONTU and amending the Copyright Act of 1976, the
House Report noted:
Some concern has-been expressed lest copyright in computer programs.should extend
protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than
merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) [of the Copyright Act of 1976]
is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the program-
mer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., at 57 (1976).
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to computer programs even though they are technically "processes" for
solving a problem or fulfilling a function. 56
Some software manufacturers have sought separate protection for
their screen displays by registering the displays as audiovisual works. 57
Although the definition of audiovisual work does not explicitly include a
display visible on a computer screen, the Copyright Office has nonethe-
less accepted screen displays for registration. 58 On some occasions,
prior to June, 1988, the Copyright Office even allowed manufacturers to
obtain two separate copyright registrations: one on the program code as
a literary work, and another on the screen displays as an audiovisual
work. In fact, M.T.I. was one of the manufacturers obtaining two sepa-
rate copyrights. However, in June, 1988, the Copyright Office issued a
policy decision stating that it would no longer allow separate registra-
tions of a computer program and its resulting screen displays. 59 In this
56 Id. In addition, the CONTU report noted, "[t]hat the words of a program are used ultimately
in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their copyrightability." Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Copyright L. Reports (CCH) 21 (July
31, 1978).
Much of the controversy over the idea/expression dichotomy deals with whether programs in
object code are protected and whether programs stored in ROM are protected. See supra note 9 for
a discussion of "object code." ROM is "Read Only Memory" which is a component of a computer
used to store part, or all, of a program. Information is permanently stored in a ROM and cannot be
altered. C. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY & HANDBOOK 469 (1980). Because of the permanency and
type of the fixation, courts were hesitant to extend copyright protection to programs stored in a
ROM. See, e.g., Data Cash Systems, Inc. v.J. S. & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aft'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he court believes that the [Copyright Act of] 1976
applies to computer programs in their flow chart and [source] ... phases but not in... ROM.... In
[ROM], the computer program is a mechanical device which is engaged in the computer to become
an essential part of the mechanical process."). However, precedent is now clear that programs
stored in ROM meet the fixation requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 10 1(a) (1988). See, e.g., Apple Com-
puter v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Either all computer programs [embodied in any medium] are within the terms 'idea, procedure,
system, method of operation' and are excluded [from copyright protection], or all of them are
outside those terms and thus protectable .... It is crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all
computer programs, fixed in any method and performing any function, be included within copyright
protection."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) ("[Tjhe medium is not
the message .... The mere fact that the ... program may be etched on a ROM does not make the
program either a machine, part of a machine or its equivalent."); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro
Computers, Inc. 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (a program stored in ROM was the proper
subject of copyright). Storing a program in ROM does not change the literary character of the
program, only the method of storage. Thus, as long as a program meets the other copyright require-
ments discussed throughout this Comment, a program stored in ROM receives copyright protection.
57 See infra note 133. "Audiovisual works" is a category of copyrighted material under the Copy-
right Act of 1976. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines audiovisual works as follows:
[W]orks that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machine or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equip-
ment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
58 According to the Copyright Office's Registration Decision, separate registrations had previ-
ously been allowed for screen displays and program code. Registration Decision, supra note 3, at
21,818. The separate registration was allowed only for a display which was predominately graphic
under the "audiovisual" section of the code. Id. Screens which were primarily textual were not
afforded separate copyright protection. Id. Since June, 1988, the Copyright Office no longer ac-
cepts separate registrations for screen displays containing either graphic or textual material. In-
stead, it reaffirmed the existing rule allowing only a single registration on each work. See infra notes
133-48 and accompanying text.
59 Registration Decision, supra note 3.
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policy decision the Copyright Office interpreted and clarified existing
federal regulations. 60
B. Elements of a Copyright Infringement Cause of Action
Registering the program and/or screen display is necessary to ob-
tain a judgment in a copyright infringement case. 61 In an infringement
suit, the plaintiff must prove two elements. 62 First, the plaintiff must
prove ownership of the copyright. 63 Second, the plaintiff must prove ac-
tual copying.64
The first element, ownership of a copyright, requires both original
material 65 and copyrightable subject matter.66 As stated previously,
copyright protection subsists from the time a work is created. 67 How-
ever, a court cannot render judgment in an infringement suit until the
material is registered in the Copyright Office.68 Although a registration
certificate issued by the Copyright Office is prima facie evidence of own-
ership, it does not guarantee the subject matter's copyrightability. 69 De-
termining whether the subject matter is copyrightable begins with the
assumption that most material is copyrightable. Then, statutory and ju-
dicial exceptions to the rule are applied to exclude certain subjects that
are not protected. For example, copyright protection does not extend to
ideas. 70 Thus, the subject matter must be an expression and not an idea.
Similarly, the work cannot be a form,71 rule or instruction, 72 since these
60 See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy decision. The
regulations interpreted by the policy decision are published at 37 C.F.R. § 202 (1989). See infra note
140 and accompanying text for a discussion of 37 C.F.R. § 202.3.
61 The copyright registration may be pursued during the course ofthe infringement litigation. 2
NIMMER, supra note 22, § 7.16[B]. "A copyright registration is effective on the date of receipt in the
Copyright Office of all the required elements in acceptable form, regardless of the length of time it
takes thereafter to process the application and mail the certificate of registration. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CIRCULAR R61 (1986). M.T.I. registered its program prior to instituting
the suit and received registrations for the screen displays and user manual during the discovery
process. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
62 "[T]here are only two elements necessary to the plaintiff's case in an infringement action:
ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff, and copying by the defendant." 3 NIMMER, supra note 22,
§ 13.01 [B].
63 3 id. § 13.03[A].
64 Id.
65 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
66 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.01[A].
67 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 19 & 61 and accompanying text.
69 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.01[A].
70 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
71 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, a book containing bookkeeping forms was
copyrighted. The forms had specific numbers of columns, ruled lines and headings. Another indi-
vidual used similar forms but with a different arrangement of columns. The Court held that copy-
right protection did not extend to the forms contained in the book. The Court stated:
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to thetauthor an exclusive
right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he em-
ploys to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion
requires. The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communi-
cate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.
Id. at 103. Commentators and other courts have extended this statement to deny copyright protec-
tion to forms and mathematical formulas.
72 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 262 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass.), aff'd,' 379 F.2d 675 (lst Cir
1967). In this case, the plaintiff filed suit alleging copyright infringement of its sweepstakes rules.
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also do not receive copyright protection. Furthermore, since lists and
processes have only a limited number of expressions, they are also not
copyrightable. 73 Thus, in any infringement case, the court will analyze
the subject matter to determine whether it is copyrightable.
To prove the second element, actual copying of the copyrighted
work, the plaintiff may introduce direct evidence. However, since it is
often difficult to obtain direct evidence, 74 copying is usually inferred by
proving access to the copyrighted work75 and substantial similarity76 be-
tween the works. 77
A two step test known as the "audience test" is used to prove actual
copying of the copyrighted work. 78 Basically, "[t]he 'audience test' is an
Following Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the court found for the defendant, holding that the
rules were not copyrightable subject matter since they could only be expressed in a limited number
of ways.
73 1 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.01[B].
74 "It is generally not possible to establish copying by direct evidence, since it is rare that the
plaintiff has available a witness to the act of copying." 3 id. § 13.01[B].
75 Access is generally defined as the opportunity to copy. However, some courts have required
proof that the duplicating author actual viewed the work and knew of the original work. 3 id.
§ 13.02. In M. T.L, the defendants had access to the screen displays through the literature they were
given as sales representatives and through demonstrations of the program. Manufacturers Technol-
ogies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989).
76 Several factors are reviewed in considering substantial similarity. According to one commen-
tator, "in evaluating the defendant's claim of independent creation, the trier may properly consider
the defendant's training, his past conduct in independently creating works, or conversely, his record
of copying in other instances." 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.01[B]. Other factors that may be
considered include the number of hours expended to produce each product, production costs, and
sales prices. In M. T.L, Cams spent only half the time that M.T.I. did to produce QUICK COST
(M.T.I. spent over 3,000 hours and Cams spent 1,500 hours; see supra notes 11 & 25 and accompany-
ing text) and its sales price was minimal compared to COSTIMATOR® (COSTIMATOR® sold for
about $20,000 and QUICK COST sold for about $2,500; see supra notes 16 & 26 and accompanying
text).
It is difficult to determine how similar works must be to constitute substantial similarity. Deter-
mining substantial similarity requires line drawing:
Somewhere between the one extreme of no similarity and the other complete and literal
similarity lies the line marking off the boundaries of "substantial similarity." Judge Learned
Hand has said that this line "wherever it is drawn will seem arbitrary" and that "the test for
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague."
3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[A] (quoting, Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), and Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487,489 (2d Cir. 1960)). In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), the court stated that the
question "is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of
lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." Id. at 473.
77 "[C]lear and convincing evidence of access will not avoid the necessity of also proving sub-
stantial similarity since access without similarity cannot create an inference of copying." 3 NIMMER,
supra note 22, § 13.03[D].
78 The "audience test" was originally enunciated in Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1868) (No. 3552). Later courts have built upon and modified the original test. In Daly, the test was a
one step process where the court determined whether substantial similarity existed based on the
knowledge of a reasonable man. This is now the second step of the audience test, known as the
intrinsic test. t
In Arnstein, Judge Learned Hand first enunciated a two step analysis. The plaintiff alleged copy-
right infringement of several songs. The court set forth a two part test to determine whether there
was evidence of infringement. Under this test, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant copied
the work. In determining whether the defendant copied the work, the court applied expert witness
testimony to dissect and analyze the entire work (both expression and idea), including both protect-
able and non-protectable material. 154 F.2d at 468. Once the plaintiff proved copying, then the
court determined whether the copying went "so far as to constitute an improper appropriation." 3
NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E].
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attempt at applying the 'reasonable man' doctrine as found in other areas
of law to copyright."' 79 The first step of the audience test is the extrinsic
test. Under the extrinsic test, the trier of fact (the judge in a bench trial
or the jury), assisted by expert testimony, determines whether there is
substantial similarity between the two works.8 0 Under the extrinsic test,
the "two works are compared in their entirety, including both protectible
and nonprotectible material."81  Although the extrinsic test usually
presents a question of fact,8 2 the extrinsic test may be decided as a matter
of law by the judge in a motion for summary judgment.83
If the court determines the works are substantially similar after ap-
plying the extrinsic test, then the court goes on to the setond step, the
79 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E].
80 154 F.2d at 468.
81 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E]. See, e.g., Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ("The court should reach the problem of eliminating from consideration the unprotected part
of plaintiff's work only if and when [the extrinsic test is met] and the issue of [the intrinsic test] is
properly before it."); McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1987) ("a
proper analysis of this issue requires that all of the elements of the work, including the uncopyright-
able text, be considered as a whole in determining copyright infringement").
There is a substantial split of authority among the courts as to what portions of the work the
extrinsic test applies. The Ninth Circuit, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), stated the extrinsic test applied only to determine whether
there was substantial similarity in general ideas (a non-protectable element; see supra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text), not to the expression of those ideas. But see, Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (extrinsic test applied to plot, dialogue and sequence which are expressions and
not merely ideas).
In NIMMER, it has been pointed out that Arnstein, in enunciating the original two step test, cited
several authorities on the issue of determining "permissible copying" in the extrinsic test discussion.
According to Arnstein, if only "permissible copying" (i.e. copying elements which are not protected
by copyright such as lists, rules and forms) was found, the work was not infringed. 154 F.2d at 472-
73. But, contrary to the Kroffl decision, the cases cited in Arnstein at note 18 to support the proposi-
tion are examples of expressions and not ideas. Id.
Three of the four cases cited at footnote 18 of the Arnstein opinion to illustrate "permis-
sible copying" are examples of similarity of expression, not merely of idea. These are:
Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (similarity of
concepts and of order of presentation amounting to a similarity of expression, excused
because such concepts and order were factual); Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 Fed. 373
(2d Cir. 1920) (verbatim similarity of expression excused because such expression taken by
plaintiff from a "public document"); Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d
73 (6th Cir. 1943) (similarity of expression excused because the articles depicted were in
the public domain, and because the quantum of such similarity of expression was so small
as to amount to a fair use). The remaining case cited, Dymow v. Bolton, I 1 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir. 1926), does appear to hold copying permissible because the similarity was only of idea
and not of expression.
3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E] n.256. Thus, Arnstein's extrinsic test calls for an examination of
both expression and idea.
In M. T.L, the court interpreted the extrinsic test as applying only to all non-protectable elements of
the work. Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989)
("the Court may first consider expert testimony relevant to the question of whether there is sufficient
similarity between non-protected aspects of the two works at issue to establish copying").
However, the extrinsic test of Arnstein, applying expert testimony to the entire work, and not
merely to ideas or non-protected elements, is generally preferred in the interest of "justice and of
avoiding nuisance litigation." 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E] n.258.
82 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
83 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) ("A district court may determine noninfringement as a matter
of law on a motion for summaryjudgment."); Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Expo., Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 154 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aft'd, 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1984) ("A court may compare the
two works and render a judgment for the defendant on the ground that as a matter of law a trier of
fact would not be permitted to find substantial similarity.").
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intrinsic test.8 4 Under the intrinsic test, the trier of fact disregards the
expert's testimony and determines whether a reasonable person would
find substantial similarity. Under the audience test, both the extrinsic
and the intrinsic steps of the test must be met before the plaintiff's in-
fringement action can succeed. 85
The intrinsic prong of the audience test is difficult to apply in copy-
right cases involving computer software since it is often impossible for
the trier of fact to "isolate the 'spontaneous and immediate' reaction of
the lay observer to two sets of object code."8 6 It is very difficult for the
judge or jury to simply disregard an expert's testimony and reach a con-
clusion based simply on the knowledge of a reasonable person. This is
even more difficult in computer cases where the trier of fact may have
only a limited understanding of the subject, based mostly on testimony
adduced at trial. The trier's task is further complicated by the difficulty
involved in analyzing program code which may seem like a foreign lan-
guage to a non-programmer.8 7
Fortunately, a recent update to the noteworthy treatise, Nimmer on
Copyright,8 8 outlined a new approach analyzing substantial similarity in
computer program copyright cases called "successive filtering."8 9 The
successive filtering approach requires a court to apply expert testimony
in a dissection of the work. The goal is to eliminate all non-protectable
elements from the analysis so that the intrinsic test of the lay observer
can be applied only to protectable expressions.
There are four major steps prescribed in successive filtering, and ex-
pert testimony is relevant in each step. First, the court must separate
unprotectable ideas from protectable expression. 90 Here, the court must
consider "all of the ideas which might underlie a computer program, and
ascertain the point at which they become sufficiently delineated to war-
rant copyright protection." 9 1 The work is broken down into decreasing
84 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
85 Id. at 469.
86 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F]. In Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 609
F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), the
court, determined that the intrinsic test of substantial similarity was not applicable to infringement
cases involving computer programs because it was so difficult to apply. See infra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Whelan.
87 See supra note 9.
88 NIMMER, supra note 22.
89 3 id. § 13.03[F]. Although "successive filtering" is a new approach, elements of it have been
implemented in prior cases. For example, in Concrete Machinery Co., Inc. v. Classic Lawn Orna-
ments, Inc., 823 F.2d 600 (Ist Cir. 1988), the court stated:
As a preliminary matter, the court can "dissect" the copyrighted work to identify those
aspects of expression that are not necessarily mandated by the idea it embodies .... By
dissecting the accused work and identifying those features which are protected in the copy-
righted work, the court may be able to determine as a matter of law whether or not the
former has copied protected aspects of the latter. The court can also determine, in at least
a general way, those aspects of the work that are protected by the copyright and that should
be considered in the subsequent comparative analysis under the ordinary observer test.
Id. at 608-09. Similarly, in Atari v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982), the court also dissected the work "to distill the
protectible forms of expression ... from the game itself" before proceeding with the intrinsic test.
90 3 NiMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F][I].
91 Id. The process of eliminating the unprotected ideas is similar to a test known as the abstrac-
tions test. Id. § 13.03[A][1]. The abstractions test looks at the work from the most general view and
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levels of complexity to eliminate those elements which are not protected
by copyright. Courts are cautioned that this step must include a thor-
ough analysis of all ideas which are included in a program-not simply
the major idea such as "word processing. '92 The problem is that a pro-
gram may have more than one idea which is not protected by copyright
and all ideas must be eliminated for this test to achieve its goal.93
In the second step of successive filtering the court, again applying
expert testimony, must exclude elements dictated by logic and effi-
ciency. 94 Many elements excluded here are those that are capable of only
a limited number of expressions and thus are not copyrightable. 95
The third step requires the court to exclude elements dictated by
external considerations. 96  The specific considerations are: hardware
standards 97 (here, elements which are included in a program because
they are necessary for the program to function properly on a specific
computer are excluded); software standards 98 (elements required by the
programming language or operating system99 are excluded); manufac-
turer's design standards100 (elements that are included in a program
based on a manufacturer's standard which provides uniformity in appli-
cations, are excluded from further analysis); and industry practices 0 1
(elements which are dictated by specific market considerations or widely
used programming techniques are excluded). Elements dictated by any
of the above considerations are then eliminated from any further
analysis.
gradually adds specific elements until a point is reached where the idea "constitutes a pattern which
is sufficiently concrete so as to warrant a finding of substantial similarity if it is common to both
plaintiff's and defendant's works." Id In other words, the abstractions test is aimed at determining
the point between the abstract idea of a word processing program, and the complete expression of
that idea in the program code, where the idea crosses into expression.
92 Id. § 13.03[F][1]. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Labs, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), was one case
which oversimplified this process. In that case, the court separated idea from expression by deter-
mining what the overall purpose of the program was, and calling that the idea; then, everything not
necessary to that purpose was an expression.
93 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F][1].
94 3 id. § 13.03[F][2].
95 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
96 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F][3]. "[A]s another step in its analysis, a court should
examine the allegedly infringed computer program after eliminating from consideration elements
that are not original, or that flow naturally from considerations external to the author's creativity.
Such considerations arise from a number of constraints." Id.
97 3 id. § 13.03[F][31[a].
98 3 id. § 13.03[F][3][b].
99 See supra note 9 for a discussion of programming terms.
100 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F][3][c]. "In many instances computer manufacturers estab-
lish standards for third party programmers to follow in designing software to run on their ma-
chines .... Similarities between two programs that result from compliance with manufacturers'
standards should not be considered evidence of illegal copying." Id.
101 3 id. § 13.03[F][3][d & e]. These include both target industry practices (i.e. the cotton indus-
try or stock market; see infra note 122) andcomputer industry practices and/or techniques which are
widely used.
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Finally, the elements that are in the public domain 10 2 are excluded
from the analysis. 10 3 'After all of these elements are eliminated, the re-
maining material is compared using the intrinsic test to determine
whether substantial similarity exists. 10 4
Thus, the successive filtering approach would require an analytic dis-
section, applying expert testimony, of the entire work to allow the court
to determine which portions constitute copyrightable subject matter and
which do not. The unprotectable items are then excluded from further
analysis, leaving the protectable items for consideration under the intrin-
sic test. The trier of fact would then determine whether substantial simi-
larity exists between only the protectable items of the work.
The successive filtering approach provides a functional solution to
the difficulty of applying the audience test in computer copyright cases.
By dissecting the work and eliminating the non-protected elements, the
trier of fact has less technical material to consider when applying the in-
trinsic test. This eliminates some confusion in dealing with both techni-
cal material and copyright issues. Since the approach is new,'0 5 it has yet
to be applied in its entirety in any case. Nimmer's discussion of the ap-
proach states:
As with any new legal rule or test, there is a danger that the analytical
method proposed herein will be difficult to apply. Because this pro-
posed method is merely a thorough and rigorous application of tradi-
tional copyright rules to cases involving computer software, however,
the danger in this instance is minimal. 10 6
Thus, successive filtering does not change the existing copyright tests
and rules. Even the traditional extrinsic test is not altered, it is simply
clarified. Courts should retain the traditional audience test of Arnstein v.
Porter,10 7 and utilize the successive filtering technique as a tool for evalu-
ating substantial similarity in computer program or screen display copy-
right cases.
102 Works in the public domain, "the realm embracing property rights that belong to the commu-
nity at large, are unprotected by copyright or patent, and are subject to appropriation by anyone."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 952 (1986).
103 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F][4]. "It is axiomatic that material in the public domain is
not protected by copyright, even when incorporated into a copyrighted work." Id.
104 3 id. § 13.03[F][5]. "After applying the doctrines set forth above, a core of protectible mate-
rial may remain. If so, this material must be compared with material from the defendant's program
to ascertain if there is a sufficient degree of similarity to justify a finding of infringement .... This
approach parallels the Second Circuit's reasoning in Arnstein v. Porter." Id.
105 The successive filtering approach was first included in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT in the Decem-
ber, 1989, update to that treatise.
106 3 id. § 13.03[F][6].
107 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra note 78 for a discussion ofArnstein. In Mf. T.L, the court
applied the audience test in analyzing whether there was infringement. Manufacturers Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989). However, the court seems to have
applied the extrinsic test improperly, stating that the extginsic test should be used in answering
"whether there is sufficient similarity between nonprotected aspects of the two works at issue." Id. (em-
phasis added). Arnstein did not limit the inquiry to only "nonprotected aspects" but instead, used the
extrinsic test throughout the entire evaluation. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text for a
discussion of 1L T.L's application of the Arnstein test.
[Vol. 65:536
COMMENT
C. Pre-M. T.L Copyright Protection for Computer Programs and Displays
The scope of copyright protection is sometimes the most difficult
issue in a computer program or display copyright infringement suit. In
M. T.L, for example, the plaintiff asked the court to determine "whether a
copyright in a computer program extends to its screen displays."10 8
Prior decisions varied widely, with some courts extending protection to
the program's overall structure and organization (including the screen
displays) and others requiring a separate copyright for screen displays.
Four leading cases address the scope of copyright protection.
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc. ,109 the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit extended a computer program's copy-
right protection to the program's sequence, structure, and organiza-
tion.' 10 The court reasoned that "insofar as everything that a computer
does, including its screen outputs, is related to the program that operates
it, there is necessarily a causal relationship between the program and the
screen outputs. The screen outputs must bear some relation to the un-
derlying programs."' I I Thus, the court believed that similarity between
screen displays had probative value in determining whether the pro-
gram's copyright had been infringed. 112 However, similarity between
screen displays alone would have been insufficient to support a finding of
infringement. 1 3
The court's analysis focused on two ways in which a program might
be substantially similar to another: comprehensive nonliteral similarity,
and fragmented literal similarity.1 4 Comprehensive nonliteral similarity
108 706 F. Supp. at 990.
109 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987). In Whelan, the court was forced to determine whether copyright protection extended beyond
the literal program code to the program's structure, sequence, and organization. The plaintiff, a
custom software manufacturer, supplied a program for dental laboratories. The defendant repre-
sented the manufacturer as a sales representative for two years. After the defendant realized the
original product could not be used on all computers, he wrote a program that would be compatible
with other types of computers. When the defendant began marketing his program, the plaintiff sued
for infringement. The court extended copyright protection to the program's sequence, structure,
and organization and found for the plaintiff. Thus, the facts of Whelan are somewhat similar to those
in M.T.L
110 The sequence, structure, and organization of a program can best be understood by examining
the parts of a book. The sequence of a book is the order in which a plot is developed throughout the
book. The structure of a book is the topical arrangement of words into sentences, sentences into
paragraphs, paragraphs into pages, etc. The organization is the functional arrangement of that ma-
terial into an introduction, chapters and a conclusion. The sequence, structure, and organization
combined, form the book.
Applying this to a program, then, the sequence is the order in which instructions are written.
The structure would refer to how and when specific functions (topics) are performed or displayed.
The organization is the manner in which the programmer elects to group the functional parts of the
program (i.e. definitions, comments, etc.). The organization, though, is frequently dictated by the
programming language used,just as the organization of a book is dictated by the subject (i.e. there is
a different organization required for a fictional work than for a legal brief).
111 797 F.2d at 1244.
112 Id.
113 Id. "Our holding that evidence of screen outputs may be admissible does not necessarily
mean that such evidence would alone be sufficient to withstand motions of summary judgment or
directed verdict." Id. at n.45. See also infra notes 125 & 176 and accompanying text.
114 The distinction between comprehensive nonliteral similarity and fragmented literal similarity,
according to Professor Nimmer, requires a value judgment. 3 NiMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[A].
Quoting Justice Story, Professor Nimmer stated that the rule is "if so much is taken that the value of
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is "a similarity not just as to a particular line or paragraph or other minor
segment, but where the fundamental essence or structure of one work is
duplicated in another." 115 In other words, comprehensive nonliteral
similarity is similarity in the overall work based on a comparison of the
entire work without paying close attention to specific details. 116 Frag-
mented literal similarity, on the other hand, is word-for-word similarity
found occasionally within a work. 1' 7 Using the concept of comprehen-
sive nonliteral similarity, the court concluded that copyright protection
extended to nonliteral elements of a computer program, namely the se-
quence, structure, and organization.
Relying on Whelan," 8 in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc.," 19 the District Court for the Northern District of California also ex-
tended copyright protection to screen displays when the plaintiff had ob-
tained a single copyright on a program. Here, the defendant's program
had screens almost identical to those in the plaintiff's program. The
court held that the single copyright covered the program's structure, se-
quence, and organization. Since the screen display was a part of that
structure, the screen was protected. 20
In a subsequent case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected Whelan's holding that a program's copyright protected
the sequence, structure, and organization of a program. In Plains Cotton
Co-Op v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc. ,121 the plaintiff alleged that the
structure and organization of a program developed by a former em-
ployee infringed its copyright on a computer program. The court specifi-
cally rejected Whelan and refused to extend protection to the program's
sequence, structure, and organization. The court reasoned that the
structural aspects were "dictated by the externalities of the cotton mar-
ket"'122 which allowed only limited ways to express these items. There-
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injuri-
ous extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy pro tanto."
Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
115 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[AI.
116 Using a cake analysis (see infra note 126), comprehensive nonliteral similarity would be found
in two recipes where one uses one egg and two teaspoons of chocolate in a cake, and the other uses
two eggs and one teaspoon of chocolate to also produce a cake. Both recipes are similar in that they
achieve the same result - a chocolate cake - but they are not identical since they use different
ingredients.
117 3 NIMMER, sUpra note 22, § 13.03[A].
118 Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 797 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
119 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). See supra note 32.
120 Id. at 1232.
121 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987). In this case an agricultural coopera-
tive developed an accounting system for its members. The cooperative agreed with another firm to
manufacture a different version of the program. Five years later, the other firm hired a former em-
ployee of the cooperative, terminated the agreement, and manufactured its own program. The co-
operative sued for infringement. The court found a lack of substantial similarity and held for
defendant.
122 Id. at 1262 n.4. Industry practices effect the way a program is written. For example, "pro-
grams intended to trade stock on the New York Stock Exchange necessarily must be designed to
comply with the rules and practices of the Exchange." 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[FI[3][d].
Thus, two programs created for the same industry will necessarily have similar elements which are
required by that industry.
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fore, the court considered the program's structural aspects "ideas" not
susceptible to copyright protection.12 3
In Digital Communications, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp. ,124 the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected Whelan and
Broderbund. The court ruled that a single copyright does not protect both
the program and the screen displays. The court criticized Broderbund,
stating:
The Broderbund court based its conclusions on what this court believes
to be an overexpansive and erroneous reading of Whalan [sic]....
Whalan [sic] dealt only with the evidentiary use of the copying of
screen displays for the purpose of establishing copying of the underly-
ing computer program. The Whalan [sic] case did not stand for, as
Broderbund believed it to, the proposition that screen displays are pro-
tected by the computer program's copyright from copying.1 2 5
Instead, the Softklone court required two separate copyright registrations
to recover for infringement of screen displays. 12 6
In summary, the precedents in this area have evolved from an over-
inclusive scope of copyright protection, to a much narrower one. Under
Whelan, copyright protection extended to a program's sequence, struc-
ture, and organization. 12 7 Broderbund expanded upon Whelan, holding
that because a program's sequence, structure, and organization were
protected, the screen displays received copyright protection incidental to
the program. 128 However, Plains Cotton rejected the notion that a pro-
gram's copyright extended to the sequence, structure, and organiza-
tion.129 Finally, the Softklone decision recognized that the Broderbund
court erroneously interpreted Whelan 130 and refused to extend a com-
puter program's copyright protection to the program's screen dis-
plays. 13 1 Instead, it required separate copyrights on the program and
screen displays to protect both elements. In light of the conflicting hold-
123 807 F.2d at 1262.
124 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). See supra note 33.
125 Id. at 455.
126 The court stated that "a computer program is considered a 'copy' of a screen display but a
screen display is not considered a 'copy' of a computer program." Id. at 456. What the court meant
by this statement is that two entirely different programs can create the same screen display, but two
identical programs cannot create two different displays. By examining the program, it is possible to
determine what the program will display. For example, by reviewing the ingredients in a cake recipe,
one could determine that the ingredients, when put together, would make a cake. Yet, there are
several different recipes, with different ingredients, that will produce a cake, just as different pro-
grams can produce the same screen.
Conversely, by simply viewing a screen display, it is not possible to determine the exact program
used to create the display. The same is true of a cake. One may look at the cake to determine that it
is chocolate or lemon, but it is impossible to determine what ingredients were used to make the cake
simply from the visual inspection.
Thus, in determining whether a program's copyright was infringed, evidence of similarity be-
tween the screens is insufficient. That would be like saying that because two cakes were chocolate,
they used the same recipe.
127 See supra notes 32 and 109-17 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 32 and 119-20 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 32. See also iifra note 155.
131 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987). See supra notes 33, 124-26 and accompanying text.
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ings, the Copyright Office held hearings to clarify the registration of
computer programs and screen displays.' 3 2
D. The Copyright Office Registration Decision on Computer Screen Displays
In September, 1987, the Copyright Office held public hearings ad-
dressing the protection of computer program screen displays. 3 3 The
hearings specifically addressed the question of whether the Copyright
Office should register screen displays separately from the underlying
computer-programs that generate them. 134
Most participants in the hearings recommended a single registration
of a computer program protecting both the program and its screen dis-
plays.135 However, other participants suggested allowing a separate re-
gistration of screen displays in addition to a copyright on the underlying
program, at the manufacturer's request. 136
As a result of the hearings, the Copyright Office issued a policy deci-
sion stating that it would no longer accept separate registrations for com-
puter programs and their screen displays. 3 7 Rather, the Copyright
Office would register either the computer program as a literary work, or
the screen displays as an audiovisual work. 138 The decision recognized
that "computer program code and screen displays are integrally related
and ordinarily form a single work."' 39 This recent policy decision ac-
132 Public Hearing, supra note 8, at 28,312.
133 See supra note 8 for a discussion of the hearings and the decision. Major software manufactur-
ers such as Apple Computer, Inc., and Lotus Development Corp., participated in the recent hearings
as did many industry support groups, professors and privately interested individuals. Registration
Decision, supra note 3. Many software manufacturers have spent a considerable amount of time and
money designing screen displays for their programs and produce program code to accommodate the
designs. The companies therefore wished to protect their investment in those screen displays
through copyright protection. This was particularly true for video game manufacturers where the
display itself markets the program. Id.
134 Public Hearing, supra note 8, at 28,311.
135 Written Submission of Professor Peter Jaszi, Washington College of Law, The American Uni-
versity at 7 (September 10, 1987) in response to Public Hearing, supra note 8 ("Since I am convinced
that, standing alone, textual screen displays do not [qualify] as copyrightable works, the risk of dis-
torting the development of the law by allowing separate registrations does not seem worth run-
ning."). Written Submission of ADAPSCO at 2 (September 9, 1987) in response to Public Hearing,
supra note 8 ("Screen displays are an integral part of the computer program that generates them and
should be registerable as such. Screen displays are physically embodied with the underlying pro-
gram in a single copy and are distributed with the program as a unit. Accordingly, single registration
makes both technical and business sense."). Written Submission of William F. Patry, Saidman,
Sterne, Kessler & Goldstein, Of Counsel at 7 (September 9, 1987) in response to Public Hearing,
supra note 8 (Mr. Patry is now a Policy Planning Advisor in the United States Copyright Office) ("the
screen display, as a part of the computer program, is protected as it appears on the screen and not
just as it appears in the computer program"). Written Submission of Ed Belove, Vice President,
Research and Development, Lotus Development Corp. at 9 (September 9, 1987) in response to
Public Hearing, supra note 8 ("it is in large part because a program is a single, albeit complex, work
that we advocate that you continue your present practice of a single registration that covers all of the
diverse copyrightable elements that a program contains").
136 Written Submission of Apple Computer, Inc., at 33 (September 4, 1987) in response to Public
Hearing, supra note 8. Written Submission ofT. Michael Elliott, The Computer Society of the IEEE
at 26 (September 9, 1987) in response to Public Hearing, supra note 8 ("because dissimilar code can
produce identical screen displays, there is little practical alternative to implementation of separate
code and display registrations").
137 Registration Decision, supra note 3.
138 Id. at 21,817.
139 Id. at 21,818. See also supra note 34.
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cords with the existing rule of single registration for a copyrighted
work. 140 The Copyright Office suggested that registering the program as
a literary work, or the screen displays as audiovisual works, will depend
on which work of authorship (the program code or the screen design)
predominates. 141 The manufacturer is free to choose under which cate-
gory to register the work, but in no case can the manufacturer register
the work twice.' 42 If the manufacturer registers the program as a literary
work, both the program and the screen displays receive copyright protec-
tion.143 If the manufacturer instead registers the screen displays as au-
diovisual wofks, only the screen displays receive protection.144
The single registration requirement will not adversely affect those
manufacturers who previously received two separate copyright registra-
tions. 145 The policy decision stated:
Since this decision confirms the validity of a single registration policy,
the Office assumes that this decision makes-clear to the public and the
courts our view that multiple claims are unnecessary, and indeed not
appropriate, to assert copyright in the screen displays.... In those
cases where separate registrations were made for computer program
code and the screen displays, the registrations are also valid if, in each
case, the registration is based on original creative authorship.' 46
Thus, although previously issued separate registrations are still valid,
multiple registrations are no longer-allowed. The Copyright Office's pol-
icy decision indicates that courts should conduct the substantial similarity
analysis by considering the entire work.' 47 With respect to the single
registration, the decision noted that "ultimately, of course, the courts de-
termine the precise scope of protection."'' 48
III. Analysis of the M. TI.L Decision
M. T.L 49 was the first reported case to decide a copyright infringe-
ment issue on screen displays after the Copyright Office's registration
140 The single registration rule states:
(3) Registration of a single work. (i) For the purpose of registration on a single application
and upon payment of a single registration fee, the following shall be considered a single
work:
(A) In the case of published works: All'copyrightable elements that are otherwise rec-
ognizable as self contained works, that are included in a single unit of publication, and in
which the copyright claimant is the same.
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, 37 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1988). The Copyright Office has outlined
three significant advantages of the single registration rule. First, the manufacturer benefits by being
able to register the entire work on a single application and paying only one filing fee. Second, the
public benefits from a clear, accurate and easily understandable public record. Finally, the Copy-
right Office benefits because the administrative process is simplified. Registration Decision, supra
note 3, at 21,819.




145 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
146 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,820.
147 See supra notes 78-85 for a discussion of the substantial similarity analysis.
148 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,819.
149 Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
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decision. It was also a case of first impression in the District Court of
Connecticut. 50 Thus, the court first discussed what precedent would ap-
ply to the case.' 51 The court examined the decisions of both
Broderbund' 52 and Softklone. 153 The M.T.L court was unpersuaded by the
Broderbund decision.' 54 Basically, the court agreed with Sofiklone's analy-
sis that Broderbund misinterpreted Whelan. 155 However, the M. TI. court
rejected the Sofiklone conclusion since that case suggested screen displays
and program code should be copyrighted separately. 56 The M.T.L
court recognized that Sofiklone was called into doubt by the Copyright
Office's recent policy decision. 157
The court considered two possible methods for analyzing M.T.I.'s
infringement claim. First, the court could follow the older thinking and
require M.T.I. to prove infringement by showing substantial similarity of
both the program code and the screen display. Second, the court could
follow the spirit of the Copyright Office policy decision and treat the sin-
gle registration as creating the "legal fiction of two separate registra-
tions."' 58 Under the second test, M.T.I. would only have to show
substantial similarity between either the program code or the screen dis-
play. The court adopted the second option, treating the single registra-
tion as the fiction of two separate registrations. 59
This novel approach to dealing with the copyright protection af-
forded screen displays attempted to harmonize the Broderbund and Soft-
klone holdings while still complying with the Copyright Office's policy
decision. 160 Although the result in M.T.L is partially correct, 161 the
150 "These arguments raise issues novel to this district and circuit which courts have only just
begun to confront." Id. at 991.
151 Id. at 991-92. The opinion directly discussed Broderbund and Sofiklone, the two decisions which
"have specifically dealt with the issue of whether the copying in a computer program should extend
protection to the screen displays generated by the program." Id. at 992. However, in a footnote, the
court also discussed both Whelan and Plains Cotton as cases which "have considered the scope of
copyright protection of a computer program copyright." Id. at 991 n.12.
152 Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). See
supra notes 32, 119 and accompanying text.
153 Digital Communications, Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
See supra notes 33, 124-26 and accompanying text.
154 706 F. Supp. at 992. "The Broderbund court sought to determine the protectible expressive
aspects of the screen displays at issue by referring to the idea of the computer program at issue....
In doing so, it overextended the scope of scope of [sic] copyright protection applicable to those
screen displays." Id.
155 Id. at 992-93. "[T]he court is not persuaded that it should adopt the Broderbund approach and
its implication that computer program infringement can be shown merely by showing substantial
similarity of screen outputs. Such an approach ignores the fact recognized by both the Whelan and
Softklone courts that more than one computer program can produce virtually the same screen dis-
play." Id.
156 Id. at 992.
157 Id. "The Copyright Office's refusal to accept separate copyright registrations of screen dis-
plays calls into doubt the validity of the first part of the Sofiklone holding because it would effectively
preclude the protection of expression in the computer screen displays, a result obviously not envi-
sioned by the Sofiklone court." Id.
158 In Al. T.L, however, it was unnecessary to create a "legal fiction of two separate registrations"
since the plaintiff held valid registrations on both the screen displays and the program. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
159 706 F. Supp. at 993. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
160 Creating the legal fiction of two separate registrations "allows the court to build on Sofiklone
by focusing on the copyrightable expression in each type of registration and avoiding the mistake of
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court's rationale may be erroneous due to several problems in the analy-
sis.162 There are three problematic areas: a) inconsistencies with the
Copyright Office's policy decision; b) misapplication of the audience test
of substantial similarity; c) inconsistencies within the M. T.L court's anal-
ysis of copyrightable subject matter and substantial similarity.
A. The Impact of the Copyright Office's Policy Decision on the Scope of
Copyright Protection
The Copyright Office announced its policy decision in June, 1988,
after plaintiffs filed their complaint in M. T.! The policy decision, how-
ever, clearly applies to the case. The Copyright Office clearly stated that
"the policies announced in this [1987] computer screen display decision
constitute in essence a confirmation of the general registration policies
first adopted in the 1978 registration regulations."'' 6 3 In addition, the
policy decision confirmed the validity of existing copyrights held on a
program and its screen displays separately. 6 4 Taken together, these two
statements suggest that although the registrations on M.T.I.'s screen dis-
play and on its program are both still valid, the MT.L court erred in
failing to consider the Copyright Office's policy decision when determin-
ing the scope of copyright protection.
The Copyright Office's policy decision issued in i988 rejected the
Softklone result. 165 It specifically disallowed multiple registrations for
computer programs, in compliance with the guidelines of 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.3.166 In addition, the Copyright Office's policy decision stated that
"the computer program code and screen displays are integrally related
and ordinarily form a single work."' 67 If the two elements are indeed a
single work, then a copyright on the program protects the screen displays
as well. Thus, courts should look at the work as a whole when determin-
ing whether substantial similarity exists.
In M.T.L, though, the court stated that the program and its screen
displays are "fundamentally distinct."' 1 8 The distinction, according to
M.T.L, was that the computer program "direct[s] the computer to effi-
ciently perform a particular task" while the screen display "is designed to
communicate with the user in a way to facilitate the understanding and
use of the program itself."' 69 Although this distinction is technically cor-
rect, M. T.L's analysis fails to recognize that the program could not oper-
ate correctly without the input of the user, and that the user's input
depends on the prompts generated by the screen display. Therefore, the
identifying a program's idea with the idea of a particular screen display or some element therein."
Id.
161 See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
162 See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
163 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,820.
164 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 134-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy decision.
166 See supra note 140 for text of 37 C.F.R. § 202.3.
167 Registration Decision, supra note 3, at 21,819.
168 Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989).
169 Id.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
program and screen displays are related and dependent upon one
another.
However, the M. T.I. court, never discussed similarity of the underly-
ing program code. Rather, without any analysis, the court simply noted
there was no evidence' 70 of source code similarity and proceeded with a
review of the screen displays. 17 1 The analysis focused solely on the flow
and content of screen displays, considering factors such as the headings
appearing on the screens, the location of instructions and specific de-
signs of unusual screens. 172 The court then found substantial similarity
between the screen displays. The court held that M.T.I.'s screen display
copyright was infringed as was its program's copyright to the extent that
the screen displays were subsumed in the program.' 73
Thus, the M. T.L analysis is somewhat inconsistent with the policy
decision of the Copyright Office. The M. T.L court stated that the copy-
right on the program was not infringed. 74 Yet, it continued its analysis,
finding that the screen display's copyright was infringed, as was the copy-
right on the "screen displays subsumed within the registration of...
[the] program."' 75 The Copyright Office's policy decision, as applied to
situations where two copyrights were issued, suggests that the proper
analysis would allow the program's copyright to extend protection to the
program and the screen displays after viewing the work as a whole. The
screen display's copyright would then protect only the screen display and
not the underlying program. If this interpretation is applied to M. T.L,
then the court was correct in holding that the screen display's copyright
was infringed. However, it was incorrect in basing its finding that the
program's copyright was infringed on substantial similarity in the screen
displays without considering the underlying code. 176 The program's
copyright could only be infringed if there was substantial similarity of the
work as a whole.
B. M. T.I. 's Incorrect Application of the Substantial Similarity Test
A court should apply the audience test to determine whether two
works are substantially similar, indicating copyright infringement. 77
The M. T.L court misinterpreted the traditional audience test by applying
170 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of proof by direct evidence.
171 706 F. Supp. at 1000. "There is, however, no evidence that the defendants had access to the
plaintiff's source code nor did plaintiff put forth any evidence of source or object code similarity."
Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
172 Id. at 994. The M.T.L court stated that evaluating substantial similarity "requires a bifurcated
analysis of the external and internal aspects of the screen displays themselves. Externally, plaintiff
claims that the flow and sequencing of the screen displays is subject to copyright protection." Id.
173 Id. at 1002. "The Court rejects plaintiff's claim that its source code has been infringed as
without adequate foundation.... Therefore, to that extent the program copyrights have not been
infringed." Id. However, "the Court holds that the defendants have infringed the copyright of the
screen display registration .. .as well as the copyright of the screen displays subsumed within the
registration of the COSTIMATOR program." Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 "[Als a matter of demonstrating substantial similarity of the programs themselves, screen out-
put alone is insufficiently probative. Two wholly different programs can generate the same screen
output." 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[F] n. 282.
177 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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the extrinsic test 78 only to "non-protected aspects" of the programs.' 79
Perhaps the court misinterpreted the extrinsic test based on a reading of
the audience test as modified by Sid &Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's
Corp. 180
In Krofft, the court recognized the continued validity of the tradi-
tional Arnstein test,' 8 ' but attempted to clarify the holding of that case.
The Krofft court interpreted Arnstein's extrinsic test as applying to "copy-
ing" merely the work's idea.' 82 In other words, the court applied expert
witnesses testimony to determine only -whether the work's non-copy-
rightable idea was substantially similar.'8 3 The court did not apply the
extrinsic test to the work as a whole, as suggested by Arnstein.18 4 The
court then applied the intrinsic test to determine whether the copying
reached a point of "unlawful appropriation," by examining both the idea
and the expression embodied in the work.' 8 5
The.M.T. court may have misinterpreted the Krofft decision as
standing for the proposition that since ideas are non-protectable ele-
ments, the extrinsic test applies only to non-protectable elements. How-
ever, this reasoning is undesirable because ideas are simply one type of
non-protectable element - rules, lists, forms and instructions also are
not copyrightable.' 8 6 Applying the extrinsic test to only non-protectable
elements might exclude elements deserving consideration from further
evaluation under the. intrinsic test.
It is also possible that M. T.L attempted to perform an analytic dis-
section, similar to the newly prescribed successive filtering method, to
exclude non-protectable elements before proceeding with the intrinsic
test.'8 7 Although the successive filtering method was not enunciated un-
til after M.T.L, elements of the method were implemented in prior
cases.18 8 Thus, while the M. T.L court may not have conducted a "suc-
cessive filtering" analysis as enunciated in Nimmer's treatise,189 it is pos-
sible that the court could have used a methodology prescribed by the
178 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extrinsic test.
179 706 F. Supp. at 1000. The M. T.L court confirmed the continued validity of the Arnstein test
based on Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 784 F.2d 44 (2d
Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). See supra note 83. The court continued, stating:
In Arnstein v. Porter . . . the court set out a two-part test for similarity which guides this
Court's analysis. . . That test provides that in a complex case such as this the Court may
first consider expert testimony relevant to the question of whether there is sufficient similar-
ity between non-protected aspects of the two works at issue to establish copying.
706 F. Supp. at 1000 (emphasis added).
180 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
181 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Arnstein test.
182 562 F.2d at 1165. ' -
183 In Krofft, the extrinsic test was applied only to determine whether there was substantial simi-
larity in general ideas, not to the expression of those ideas. Expert testimony was relevant to com-
plete an "analytic dissection" of specific criteria including "the type of artwork involved, the
materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject." Id at 1164. -
184 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
185 562 F.2d at 1164.
186 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
187 See Supra notes 89-106 for a discussion of the new successive filtering approach.
188 See supra note 89. -
189 See supra notes 89,106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the successive filtering
method.
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prior courts. Yet, once again, even if M. T.IL intended to apply a method
similar to successive -filtering, the court's substantial similarity analysis
was incorrect.
Under successive filtering, the entire work is examined to determine
which elements are copyrightable subject matter and which elements are
non-protectable. The non-protectable elements are then excluded from
any further analysis. Only the protectable elements are submitted to the
trier of fact for a determination of substantial similarity using the intrin-
sic test. If M. T.L had attempted to perform this type of analytic dissec-
tion, the proper approach would have been to use expert testimony to
evaluate the entire work, and then exclude non-protectable elements.
M. T.L's analysis, where expert testimony was used only on non-protectable
elements, followed neither the traditional audience test nor the newly
prescribed successive filtering approach. On the other hand, if the
M. TL court had applied the extrinsic test to all aspects of the program
under either the traditional test or successive filtering method, it may
have reached a different result, as discussed in the following section.
C. Inconsistencies in M. TL s Finding of Copyrightable Subject Matter and
Substantial Similarity
Commentators have noted that the audience test is often applied im-
properly.' 90 In this case, the M. TI.L court made a mistake similar to that
in Krofft by narrowing the scope of material analyzed under the extrinsic
test, specifically stating that the extrinsic test applied only to "non-pro-
tected aspects" of the programs. 191 Thus, the court must have applied
the extrinsic test only to those elements of the screen displays containing
material which was not copyrightable. In its extensive analysis of individ-
ual screen displays, the court found that many screen displays contained
lists, forms and other elements which were dictated by functional consid-
erations and were therefore not copyrightable subject matter. 92 For ex-
ample, in the discussion of Screen 8, the court described the screen's
contents as calculations of operations in a columnar format. The court
found that this was not copyrightable subject matter because it was not
original and was only capable of a limited number of expressions. 193
Thus, the extrinsic test was applied to Screen 8 and others containing
non-copyrightable subject matter. The intrinsic test (where the isolated
observations of trier of fact as a lay observer are relevant) was correctly
applied only to screens containing copyrightable subject matter.
The analysis in M. T.L is best understood by reviewing the specific
screen displays and elements the court considered; reviewing the con-
tents of those screen displays; looking to whether the court found the
material copyrightable subject matter; and finally, looking at whether the
190 3 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 13.03[E] ("[T]he audience test has had an artificial and disap-
pointingly inaccurate application").
191 Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989).
192 See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of copy-
rightable subject matter. See supra note 38 for a discussion of specific elements the court considered
in M.T.L
193 706 F. Supp. at 998.
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finding of infringement was based on that screen display or element.
The following chart summarizes the M. T.L court's analysis.
Screen Contents of Is it Was it
Number Screen Display Copyrightable? Infringed?
3 2 column, alphabetical list of No Undecided
departments
4 Request for job information, Yes Yes
part number, name,
customer name, etc.
7 Unknown Unknown Yes
8 Calculation of operations in No Yes 194
a columnar format
9 Columnar list of component Yes Portions
parts
15 Lists similar to screen #8 No Yes' 95
- Sequence/flow of display Yes Yes




Navigation Backspace key and spacebar No Yes
Method for moving between screens
Method of identifying the Yes Yes
deparment and tool
(OPERATION #, TOOL #)
As the above chart illustrates, the M. TI. court based the finding of
infringement on similarity in certain aspects of the screen displays which
contained non-copyrightable material. This conclusion resulted from the
court's improper application of the audience test.
By misapplying the two part test, the MT.I. court reached inconsis-
tent results. After ruling that certain screens contained material that was
not subject to copyright protection, such as Screen 8, the court then ap-
plied the extrinsic test and found substantial similarity between the un-
protected screen displays of the two programs. The court found
substantial similarity in Screen 8 because the two works utilized the same
redundant language.197 Similarly, the method of navigation (i.e. the use
of the spacebar and backspace keys to move between screens) was dic-
tated by functional considerations (i.e. the type of computer on which the
program was run, the type of keyboard and similar restrictions), and
194 In this screen, infringement was based on redundancy of titles and capitalization.
195 In this screen, infringement was based on similarity of capitalization.
196 With respect to the format, only the capitalization, alphabetical arrangement and centering
were infringed.
197 706 F. Supp. at 1001.
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therefore was not copyrightable subject matter. 98 Yet, the court again
found that there was substantial similarity since both programs used the
same method. 199 Because there were examples of substantial similarity,
the court held that M.T.I.'s copyrights were infringed.200
An infringement action can only succeed if the work was copyright-
able.20 1 If these elements were truly outside the scope of copyright pro-
tection, then, regardless of whether evidence of substantial similarity
existed, the court should not have found evidence of infringement.
IV. Conclusion
The Copyright Office has not allowed a program and its screen dis-
plays to be copyrighted separately sinceJune, 1988. However, copyrights
issued separately on a program and its screen displays prior to the policy
decision are still valid. The copyright on the program protects both the
program and the screen display when the work is viewed as a whole. The
copyright on the screen display protects that element alone.
When a court considers whether a program copyright has been in-
fringed, it must consider the work as a whole (both the program code
and the screen displays) to determine whether there is substantial simi-
larity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work.
Substantial similarity between the screen displays alone is only sufficient
to find infringement of a screen display's copyright (under the audiovi-
sual category), not a program's copyright (under the literary works cate-
gory). Therefore, the court should find infringement only when the
material contained copyrightable subject matter (i.e. it is an expression
and not an idea), when the infringing party had access to the work, when
there was substantial similarity between the two programs as a whole,
and when there was evidence of illicit copying (either literal copying, or
non-literal copying of the overall sequence, structure, and organization
of the program).
In M. T.L, the court misapplied the audience test of substantial simi-
larity. Simply, this test is a two step process to determine whether sub-
stantial similarity exists: 1) the extrinsic test where the trier of fact
(either the judge in a bench trial, or the jury) evaluates the work assisted
by expert testimony; and 2) the intrinsic test where the trier of fact disre-
gards the expert's testimony and determines whether a reasonable per-
son would find the copying illicit or unlawful.
By applying the extrinsic test only to non-protectable elements, the
M. T.L court extended copyright protection to elements which contained
non-copyrightable subject matter. Substantial similarity of non-copy-
rightable elements should not have resulted in a finding of infringement
since no protection was available. In addition, the court misinterpreted
the policy decision of the Copyright Office allowing only a single regis-
tration of a computer program and its screens. Since there was no evi-
198 Id. at 995.
199 Id. at 1001.
200 Id. at 1002.
201 See supra notes 65-73.
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dence of substantial similarity in the program code, the only copyright
the court should have considered was M.T.I.'s copyright on the screen
displays. Even then, the court should only have found infringement
where there was substantial similarity between the screen displays con-
taining copyrightable subject matter.
The M. T.L decision is a learning tool for courts facing this issue in
the future. The opinion is an excellent example of the problems that
arise in applying traditional tests to technological advancements. In the
future, courts should bear in mind that a program and its screen displays
are indeed interrelated. Courts should not create a legal fiction of two
separate registrations and any substantial similarity analysis should view
the work as a whole.
Ginamarie A. Gaudio
